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Why has Japan suffered from the NPL problem for such a long time? We will 
answer to this question from a governance perspective that emphasizes important 
influence of the governance structure on bank management. In our opinion, Japan 
failed to motivate banks to play the role of monitoring essential to the 
bank-centered financial system. We will stress that there existed a vacuum of 
governance in the bank management in the sense that bank managers were not 
effectively disciplined as to attain sufficient prudence in there management. The 
vacuum of governance accounts for the fragility of the banking sector and, more 
importantly, the prolongation of the NPL problem in Japan. 
 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
*  This paper was prepared for presenting at the APEC/University of Hawaii 






“The view that actual behaviour is always to be understood as an 
efficient solution to a particular incentive problem seems a very high 
order of rationality, and says nothing about the process by which an 





Table 1 and 2 summarize the data of Japanese banks’ non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in terms of ‘risk management loans’ since March 1998, when they began 
to disclose figures of comprehensively defined NPLs. The definition of risk 
management loans is comparable to that of NPLs adopted by the SEC in the 
United States. This table shows that during the last few years the amount of NPLs 
slightly increased amounting to more than ¥32 trillion, around 6.5 percent of GDP. 
The portion of NPLs not covered by the reserves for loan losses almost doubled 
from ¥13.8 trillion in March 1998 to ¥25.3 trillion in March 2001.
1  
     T h i s  i n c r e a s e  i n  N P Ls does not necessarily mean Japanese banks’ passivity 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
1  On May 24, 2002, all of the Japan’s major banks (13 banks) reported the 
amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) existing at the end of March 2002. 
According to the reports, the total amount of those banks’ NPLs increased to 
around ¥27.2 trillion on the consolidation bases, which accounted for 8.5% of 
loans and was 47% larger than that observed one year ago. To dispose of the 
NPLs, the major banks spent more than ¥8.0 trillion, which was more than twice 
of their current earnings from businesses. At the end of the last year, the 
government announced a scenario of eliminating NPLs by fiscal 2004. But the 





çregarding disposal of NPLs. They seem to have been rather active in disposing of 
their NPLs. For example, during the last three years since April 1997, the 
Japanese banks recorded bad loan losses amounting to ¥27.7 trillion. Nevertheless, 
the amount of NPLs not covered by reserves increased during the same period. 
Obviously, the amount of NPLs has been increasing at a substantial speed in the 
Japanese banking sector during the last few years mainly due to the recent 
slowdown of the Japanese economy.
2 
     The  increasing  number  of bankrupted depository institutions (i.e., banks and 
cooperative financial institutions) in Table 3 also shows the current fragility of the 
Japanese banking sector. According to this table, more than 170 depository 
institutions have failed during the last decade since 1991. Most of the failures 
occurred since the mid-1990s. Until the end of March 2001, the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (DIC) spent nearly ¥20 trillion to deal with those bank failures 
mainly with a view to protecting depositors. In addition, the government injected 
‘public funds’ amounting to ¥10 trillion into a number of big banks to strengthen 
their capital bases since March 1998. 
     In spite of those capital injections, the Japanese banking sector has not 
succeeded in finding a way out of the swamp. The disclosed figures in Table 1 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
2  We should not neglect the NPLs in the sector of cooperative financial 
institutions, a major part of which is comprised of sinkin banks and credit 
cooperatives. The relative magnitude of the NPL problem seems more serious in 
this sector than in the banking sector. At March 2001, the NPLs amounted to 
¥10.9 trillion (8.2% of the total loans) in this sector, and three fourths of the 





çgive no hint of an immediate settlement of the NPL problem. To make matters 
worse, many people suspect the authenticity of the disclosed NPL figures, because 
bank managers could manipulate their assessment to underrate the amount of 
NPLs in some ways, and because they have strong incentives to do so. Thus, the 
current situation of the Japanese NPL problem may be much worse than what 
Table 1 suggests.
3  
     The Japanese government started the so-called ‘pay-off’ of the deposit 
insurance at April 2002. This policy implies the abolition of the traditional 
blanket guaranty to protect all the depositors. Responding to this new regime, 
depositors have become very sensitive to soundness of banks. They started to shift 
their deposits from time deposits, which are insured only up to ¥10 million, to 
ordinary deposits, which are to be covered without any ceilings until the end of 
March 2003. They have also shifted their deposit from smaller banks to larger 
ones to which they suppose the ‘too big to fail’ doctrine will be applied. Thus, 
there remains large uncertainty whether or not banks will be able to survive the 
critical situation.   
Why has Japan suffered from the NPL problem for such a long time? We 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
3  It is probable that the Financial Services Agency (FSA) allowed banks to 
underrate the amount of NPLs. This FSA’s policy made it possible for the banks 
to take the policy of gradually disposing their NPLs within the narrow limits of 
current profits. Obviously, this was a forbearance policy. It was accompanied with 
a delay of final resolution of the NPL problem. On the other hand, it is 
conceivable that this policy helped the banks avoid unnecessary liquidation of 
borrower firms in financial distress, which might worsen Japan’s economic 





çwill answer to this question from a governance perspective that emphasizes 
important influence of the governance structure on bank management. In our 
opinion, Japan failed to motivate banks to play the role of monitoring essential to 
the bank-centered financial system. We will stress that there existed a vacuum of 
governance in the bank management in the sense that bank managers were not 
effectively disciplined as to attain sufficient prudence in there management. The 
vacuum of governance accounts for the fragility of the banking sector and, more 
importantly, the prolongation of the NPL problem in Japan. 
     The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section (Section 2) 
discusses the weakness of the managerial governance in the Japanese banking 
sector from the three perspectives; i.e. the disciplinary influence of the capital 
market, the pressures from market competition, and the disciplinary influence 
from the supervising authority. Section 3 discusses what we learn from responses 




2. Defects of Governance in Bank Management 
     Efficiency of a bank-centered financial system, which is typically observed 
in Germany and Japan, depends on banks’ monitoring of their client firms’ 
management. Banks must play essential roles of evaluating credit-worthiness of 
borrowers and monitoring their management in order to prevent their moral 





çthe prudent monitoring by banks? This is an issue ‘who monitors the monitor’ 
(Aoki (1994) and Prowse (1995)). If we fail to resolve this issue, the banking 
system is likely to be unstable, and impose heavy burden on taxpayers (Kane 
(1995)). 
     A c c o r d i n g   t o   t h e   s t a n d a r d   theory of corporate governance, bank 
management could be disciplined by the following three means (Allen and Gale 
(2000)): 
(1)  Capital market where either investors, particularly debt-holders including 
depositors, monitor performance of individual banks or the threat of 
hostile takeovers discipline managers for bad performance, 
(2)  Competition in the banking industry that weeds out inefficiently managed, 
or 
(3)  The supervision by regulatory authorities that prevents banks from taking 
excessive risk in the ex ante stages or forces managers of distressed banks 
to restructure their businesses in the ex post stages. 
In the following, I will stress that these disciplinary means did not work in the 
case of Japan’s bank management. 
 
2.1 Lack of capital market discipline   
    The standard theory of the corporate governance stresses importance of the 
disciplinary effect of the capital market on management (e.g. Monks and Minow 
1995: Chapter 2). According to the theory, both the internal governance 
mechanisms based on the board of directors, and the external mechanisms of 





çHowever, as Allen and Gale (2000: 80) argue, the effectiveness of the capital 
market mechanisms has been widely questioned. Even in both the United States 
and United Kingdom, where the capital markets are supposed to have developed 
its disciplinary functions, incumbent managers seem to control decision making of 
the board of directors. A number of empirical researches on the effectiveness of 
hostile takeovers show that, contrary to the standard theory, the takeovers are not 
effective in enhancing the profitability of the targeted firms. 
     The Japanese capital market might have been particularly powerless in 
disciplining corporate managers because the managers of big companies have 
entrenched themselves by means of mutual shareholdings with other corporations. 
The banks are not exceptional for this case. Moreover big banks constituted the 
core part of the traditional mutual shareholding, which functioned to protect 
incumbent managers from the pressure of capital markets.4    As for investors into 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
4  With  respect  toçthe capital market mechanism, we should note Japanese banks 
are more diffusely held than non-financial companies are. According to Kim and 
Rhee (1997), the top six shareholders of banks hold on the average 18.4 percent of 
the total shares outstanding. In contrast, Prowse (1992) finds that the top five 
shareholders for the Japanese mining and manufacturing companies hold 33.1 
percent of the total shares outstanding.   
     I t  i s  a l s o  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a t  i n s u rance companies have often occupied the 
status of largest shareholders of banks. The insurance companies were helpful to 
incumbent bank managers when they were required to strengthen their capital 
bases responding the introduction of BIS capital adequacy regulation at the end of 
the 1980s. Specifically, in order to increase their equity capital, Japanese banks 
issued a large amount of subordinate debt (or subordinate loans), which are 





çbanks’ debt, they had no strong incentives to monitor and discipline bank 
management because of existence of a blanket guaranty in the Japanese financial 
system. 
 
     The mechanisms of the blanket guaranty: The financial safety net is widely 
recognized as indispensable to minimize the spillover effects of failures of banks 
and other financial institutions on the financial system as a whole (Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)). However, the operation of the 
safety net changes the ex post distribution of social costs associated with bank 
failures. This risk-sharing implication of safety net decreases the monitoring 
incentives of depositors and other investors because they are either explicitly or 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççç
debt to help bank management. The main objective for the insurance companies to 
buy banks’ subordinated debt was obviously not to monitor bank management 
more strongly, but to keep business relationships with the banks. The insurance is 
most heavily protected in the Japanese financial industries. It is a plausible story 
that the government permitted banks to issue subordinate debts to increase their 
capital at the end of the 1980s immediately after the BIS capital adequacy 
regulation became effective, then implicitly order (or recommend?) insurance 
companies to support banks by buying most of the debts. If so, the insurance 
companies have been far from a reliable monitor of bank management. Fukao 
(2001: 29) points out that banks and life insurance companies relied on each other 
to raise broadly defined capital. While banks provided subordinated credit and 
surplus notes to life-insurance companies amounting ¥2.3 trillion at the end of 
March 2000, life-insurance companies provided ¥6.7 trillion of subordinated 
credit to banks and owned ¥7.7 trillion of banks stocks. “Given this effective 
double gearing between the two, it is difficult to expect strong governance 





çimplicitly protected from losses associated with bank failures (Black, Miller, and 
Posner (1978)). In order to keep the safety net viable, appropriate incentive 
mechanisms are required to reinforce monitoring of bank management. The wider 
is the scope of the financial safety net, the stronger moral hazard incentives are 
given to bank management, and thus, the more energetically the regulatory 
authorities must monitor banks to prevent excessive risk-taking in place of 
depositors and investors.5 
     The  Japanese  financial  system  was  covered by a virtual blanket guaranty of 
the safety net implemented by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). It was usual for the 
MOF to either rescue or dispose of distressed financial institutions in tight 
collaboration with the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and private financial institutions, 
particularly the major banks belonging to the group of city banks and long-term 
credit banks. 
     Probably the most important rescue program implemented by the MOF 
before 1990 was the merger between Sumitomo Bank and Heiwa-Sogo Bank in 
October 1986. Heiwa-Sogo got into difficulty during the first half of the 1980s. In 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
5  Total abolition of the financial safety net would strengthen the incentives of 
depositors and investors to monitor and discipline bank management. However, 
most of depositors are small-sized wealth-holders enjoying no economy of scale 
in collecting and analyzing information about bank management. There also exists 
a "free-riders" problem to hinder efficient information production. Thus, it would 
be unrealistic to totally depend on the market discipline to keep stability of the 
banking system. As Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argue, we need to have a sort 






ç1985, the MOF made a bailout plan in order to prevent the outright bankruptcy of 
Heiwa-Sogo from destabilizing the Japanese banking industry as a whole. In 1986, 
the MOF succeeded in persuading Sumitomo to absorb Heiwa-Sogo. Despite de 
facto bankruptcy, the closure of Heiwa-Sogo did not cause damage to depositors 
and holders of other debt issued by this bank. Sumitomo bore the cost of dealing 
with the distressed bank. On the other hand, Sumitomo was able to expand its 
branch network at once by absorbing Heiwa-Sogo's branches. This was beneficial 
for Sumitomo who wanted to extend the branch network in the metropolitan area. 
     As  this  case  suggests, the MOF’s program protected not only depositors, but 
also other investors into bank debts from the risk of bank failures. In some cases, 
the bailout program virtually lessened even the burden of banks shareholders.6  
When Japan’s bank crisis got worse and a number of banks and depository 
institutions such as credit cooperatives went bankrupt in the mid-1990s, the 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
ýççBanks’ shareholders may have been protected in compensation for their silence 
on bank management. In reality, the shareholders have been rather similar to 
debt-holders in the governance structure of bank management. This is evidenced 
by the fact that a dividend on bank shares has been extremely stable regardless of 
bank performance. For example, the profits of city banks were either very small or 
negative during the five years from 1993 to 1997 mainly due to large loan loss 
provisions. Nevertheless, the city banks continued to pay almost constant amount 
of dividends to their shareholders. The total amount of profits for the city banks 
was less than minus ¥1.8 trillion for the five years. On the other hand, the total 
amount of dividend paid out by the city banks was a little larger than ¥1.0 trillion 
for the same five years. If they had not paid the dividend at all, the total amount 






çMOF’s traditional rescue program was found too costly. Then, the MOF belatedly 
started to burden some debt-holders and shareholders with bankruptcy costs of 
failed banks.7  However, it was too late. The disciplinary function of the capital 
market would have been constructive in preventing banks from engaging in 
excessive risk-taking during the 1980s. The blanket guaranty blocked the capital 
market’s function of preventing a serious NPL problem in Japan. The Japanese 
government should have narrowed the scope of the financial safety net before the 
NPL problem got serious. Actually, after the bank crisis got worse, the 
government decided to abandon the blanket guaranty by starting the so-called 
pay-off of deposit insurance. This is a mistaken policy sequence.   
      
     The  function  of  the  DIC: The Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) has been 
equipped with a means of paying off the insured deposits of failed banks from the 
time of its establishment in 1971. However, the government  announced in 
December 1995, a quarter century after the start of deposit insurance, that they 
were not yet prepared to exercise it. In December 1997, the government declared 
that all investments into deposits and other bank debts such as bank debentures 
would be protected from bank failures.8  The purpose of this policy was to calm 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
þççWhen Kosumo, one of the largest credit cooperatives, went bankrupt in July 
1995, some financial institutions lending to the credit cooperative were forced to 
bear some of its bankruptcy costs. When Hyogo Bank and Taiheiyo Bank were 
reorganized into new banks after their bankruptcy in 1995 and in 1996 
respectively, the shareholders’ equity of the old banks was reduced.ç





çpeople's growing concern over the danger of bank failures during the financial 
crisis following the bankruptcy of Hokkaido-Takushoku Bank and the failures of a 
few major securities companies, including Yamaichi at the end of 1997. 
     O f  c o u r s e ,  t h i s  d e c l aration is likely to produce further moral hazard on the 
side of bank management by weakening incentives of depositors and investor to 
monitor bank management.9  However, even before the declaration the existence 
of a long-standing blanket guaranty had produced among depositors and other 
investors a perception that they would never be required to share the burden if 
their banks should go bankrupt. Because of this widespread perception, a 
government policy of paying off insured deposits without rescuing other bank 
debts would have resulted in an unexpected shock to the financial system, and 
thereby made Japan’s bank crisis more serious. Thus, at the end of 1997, the 
Japanese government had no choice but to ensure that the traditional blanket 
guaranty was valid. 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççç
required time-consuming procedures when debt holders’ stakes were reduced. 
Thus, it was practically impossible to operate the pay off within a few days under 
the legal framework. The amendment of Deposit Insurance Law of 2000 eased the 
legal framework to make the pay-off of a failed bank’s deposits possible.ç
9  On May 22 1999, the Financial Revitalization Commission announced that 
Kofuku Bank, a regional banks located in Osaka, would be under the control of an 
official receivers appointed by the Commission. At that time, the chairman of the 
Commission accused the bank of borrowing the huge amount of money from 
inter-bank money markets with substantial premiums immediately after the 
Commission ordered the bank to take prompt corrective actions to strengthen its 
capital. This is a typical moral hazard like behavior, and it is just the tip of an 





ç     Since the beginning of the 1990s, when the ‘bubble’ burst, it has become 
increasingly difficult for the MOF to maintain the tradition method to bail out 
bank failures. This is reflected in the fact that the government has often utilized 
the facility of deposit insurance to cope with the financial distress of individual 
banks, although, as we have explained, the paying off of insured deposits has 
never been exercised. The increasing importance of the DIC in the government’s 
bailout scheme marked a significant change in the operation of the Japanese safety 
net.
  
          From April 1992, when the DIC supplied funds to bail a small regional bank 
out, to March 2001, the DIC intervened into 93 cases of disposing troubled banks 
and provided the banks participating in the bailout schemes with subsidies of 
more than ¥14.7 trillion. In addition, the DIC spent more than ¥5.1 trillion to 
purchase bad loans from failed banks. The deposit insurance system will be more 
and more intensively utilized in the Japanese financial safety net. 
 
2.2 Disciplinary influence of market competition 
     We  may  expect  that  full-scale market competition will exert strong 
disciplinary influence on corporate management by weeding the inefficiently 
managed firms out. It should be noted that there exist some theoretical models, 
which refutes the disciplinary effect of product market competition (Nickell, 
Nicolitsas, and Dryden (1997)). However, the following argument given by Allen 
and Gale (2000: 109-110) seems very convincing:  





ç[managers] identify new opportunities and coordinate the managerial team as 
it seeks to exploit these opportunities. In such cases, it may not be possible to 
say with any degree of confidence ex ante, which management will succeed 
and which will fail. It is precisely in this case that competition in the product 
market can be important. In the absence of valuable information on the part of 
shareholders and effective means of controlling management decisions, 
competition among companies both reveals which managers are the best and 
at the same time disciplines them.’   
Thus, regardless of its specific ownership structure or any other financial 
governance structure, the corporate management would be disciplined by market 
competition.10  
     The  Japanese  manufacturing  firms may have achieved excellent 
performance not because they have been effectively disciplined via the 
bank-centered financial system, but because they have long faced with fierce 
competition in the global market. Although this view remains a conjecture that 
must be empirically tested in the future, it is fairly well grounded (Hanazaki and 
Horiuchi (2001)). In contrast, the Japanese financial services industries including 
the banking sector have been protected from full-scale competition by the 
counter-competition regulation. Thus, the market competition has not worked to 
discipline management in the banking and other financial services industries in 
Japan. This accounts for the current fragility of the Japanese financial system. 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
10  Nevertheless, as Allen and Gale (2000: 110) suggests, there exists only a 






     Role  of  counter-competition regulations: The counter-competition 
restricting regulations, such as interest rate controls and restriction on new entry 
into banking and other financial business through the system of 
compartmentalization, conferred a handsome amount of rents on existing banks 
and other financial institutions. Although it has never been explicitly announced, 
the primary purpose of the MOF's administrative guidance was to suppress 
full-scale competition in each of the compartmentalized financial businesses, 
thereby protecting the less competitive small-scale banks, shinkin banks and credit 
cooperatives. The MOF's policy stance was often called the ‘convoy 
administration.’11 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççç
on efficient corporate management. 
11  The MOF's administration of branch offices was a significant area of 
regulation. During the high growth period, when almost all deposit interest rates 
were under regulation, branch offices were an important means of non-price 
competition for banks and essentially the vehicle by which they competed for 
deposit funds. Under the MOF's administration, banks were not free to either 
expand or change the location of their branch networks. In permitting new 
branches, the MOF reportedly gave preferential treatment to small banks. The 
number of branches of small-scale banks increased more rapidly than did that of 
city banks, both during and after the high growth period (Horiuchi (1984)). The 
MOF partially abandoned branch administration by allowing regional banks and 
shinkin banks to freely increase the number of branch offices in May 1993. At that 
time, the MOF announced that the branch regulation for city banks would be 
gradually liberalized while taking into account the influence on small and medium 
sized financial institutions. In May 1995, the MOF totally liberalized the 





ç    Some scholars argue that the counter-competition regulation contributed to 
sustenance of the Japanese traditional financial regime in two ways (Aoki (1994) 
and Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (1997)). First, it produced the rent in the 
financial service industry that gave banks and other financial institutions 
incentives to refrain from excessive risk-taking in order to continue enjoying 
handsome rents. Furthermore, thanks to protection offered by the 
counter-competition regulations, even inefficiently managed banks rarely went to 
the brink of managerial difficulty that is particularly likely to induce moral hazard 
behavior.12 
     Second, the regulators were able to utilize the rents accumulated in the 
banking sector as a means of dealing with banks in financial distress. Specifically, 
the regulators relied on private banks' collaboration in implementing the safety net, 
and major banks faithfully bore a disproportionate share of the costs involved. 
This mechanism would not have worked had the major banks not enjoyed the rents 
stemming from the counter-competition regulations. The MOF also utilized the 
regulations to induce banks to accept its initiatives in the process of dealing with 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
12  Aoki (1994) argues, by assuming asymmetric information about banks' 
monitoring activities, that the rent was necessary to motivate private banks to 
faithfully and efficiently monitor their borrowers. He suggests that the long-term 
relationship between major banks and borrower firms, called the "main bank 
relationship," in Japan was crucially dependent on the competition-restricting 
regulations. However, the restricting full-scale competition was not always 
necessary to motivate banks to supply a "high quality" level of monitoring. The 
laissez-faire market would be able to motivate banks to conduct good monitoring. 





çbank failures. The MOF could do favors for those banks that toed the line and to 
penalize those who failed to heed their guidance by manipulating the regulatory 
means. The specific administrative guidance based on the counter-competition 
regulation was an instrument for the MOF to determine the distribution of rents 
among banks.13 
     The counter-competition regulation was thus an ingredient of the Japanese 
traditional safety net. However, the regulation seems to be self-defeating in the 
following sense. As has been pointed out, the rent could be an important incentive 
for prudent bank management. Nevertheless, but for a credible penalty for 
inefficient management, the incentive would be powerless in ensuring banks’ 
prudent management. The MOF did not prepare any credible penalty for 
inefficient management. Rather, through the ‘convoy administration,’ the MOF 
virtually protected inefficiently managed banks and financial institutions. The 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
13  Even during the 1990s, the MOF manipulated its administrative guidance in 
order to induce private banks to collaborate with its rescue program. In 1994, for 
example, Mitsubishi Bank obtained preferential treatment from the MOF in 
exchange for rescuing Nippon Trust Bank, which had been seriously damaged by 
the accumulation of a huge amount of bad loans since the early 1990s. Mitsubishi 
Bank was 'rewarded' by being allowed to pursue a full complement of trust 
banking business through Nippon Trust, which is now its subsidiary. Other banks 
are prohibited by the MOF from engaging in full-line trust banking business 
through their trust bank subsidiaries. The same story is true of the case in which 
Daiwa Bank financially supported Cosmo Securities Company, which was 
seriously damaged by the depression in the securities market after the "bubble" 
burst at the beginning of the 1990s. Cosmo has been a subsidiary of Daiwa Bank. 





çMOF’s administration based on the counter-competition regulation worked to 
keep the old-fashioned financial system intact in the face of rapidly developing 
technologies related to financial services. According to the terminology used by 
North (1990), the counter-competition regulation deprived the Japanese financial 
system of ‘adaptive efficiency.’ 
 
     Delayed deregulation in the financial markets: Although Japan started the 
financial deregulation at the beginning of the 1980s, the deregulation policy was 
colored with ‘gradualism.’ The government took the policy of gradually 
liberalizing financial system in order to prevent ‘unduly destabilizing’ impacts of 
financial deregulation. In reality, this gradualism was synonymous with the policy 
of protecting vested interests existing in the financial services industries. The 
gradualism thus suppressed disciplinary effects that the financial deregulation was 
expected to exert on management in the financial services industries including 
banking.14  The so-called ‘Big Bang’ financial reform plan proposed by the 
Hashimoto cabinet in November 1996 was the government’s commitment to 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççç
permitted to the securities subsidiaries of other banks. 
14  The financial deregulation was promoted by the pressures from abroad, 
particularly from the U.S., rather than on the government initiative. For example, 
the ad-hoc Yen/Dollar agreement between U.S. and Japan, which was realized by 
the strong requirement by the Reagan administration in 1984, compelled the 
Japanese government to specify a timetable of liberalizing financial markets. 
Frankel (1984) explains the process of the Yen/Dollar agreement. Takeda and 
Turner (1992) discuss the relationship between the internationalization of 





çabandon the policy gradualism. This sort of ‘shock-therapy’ was needed to make 
up for lost time. 
     We could not totally deny the impact of financial deregulation on domestic 
financial markets during the 1980s. In particular, major companies reduced their 
dependence on bank borrowing by issuing a large amount of corporate bonds in 
international markets. This internationalization of corporate finance induced the 
deregulation of domestic corporate bond markets since the mid-1980s (Takeda and 
Turner (1992)). However, the Japanese banks and other financial institutions were 
able to base their domestic business on the huge amount of wealth accumulated by 
households amounting to ¥1,200 trillion as of the mid-1990s. Thus, it would be an 
exaggeration to say that the internationalization of corporate finance exerted 
substantial influence on their way of business. Heavily protected in the domestic 
market, many Japanese banks surprised their foreign rivals by aggressive 
expansion of business in international markets during the 1980s. Since it 
sacrificed profitability, the aggressiveness undermined soundness of bank 
management.15 
 
2.3 The role of regulators: Another agency problem 
     U n d e r   t h e   c u r r e n t   l e gal framework, the great authority and responsibility of 
monitoring bank management is delegated to the government. The Banking Law 
authorizes the government to intervene into bank management for the purpose of 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
15  After the burst of the ‘bubble’ at the beginning of the 1990s, most Japanese 





çattaining managerial prudence through the regulators, specifically the MOF, and 
the Financial Services Agency (FSA) that took over the role of supervising from 
the MOF in 2000. 
     Ideally the regulators would maintain the safety net so as to impose the 
lowest social costs. They do not automatically pursue this social obligation, 
however, because they tend to give priority to their own preference over the 
policy objectives assigned by taxpayers. If the regulators fail to conscientiously 
pursue their designated policy goals, banks could aggressively extend their 
risk-taking activities, transfer this risk to taxpayers, and thereby undermine the 
viability of the safety net itself. Kane (1995) analyses how this aspect of the 
principal-agent problem between the regulator, banks, and taxpayers destabilizes 
the financial system covered by the safety net.16 
     Banks’ shareholders benefit when a safety net facilitates more aggressive 
risk-taking by the bank. To limit this type of risk-taking by banks at the expense 
of taxpayers, regulators are responsible for monitoring banks, using means such as 
requiring banks keep their capital/asset ratios at sufficiently high levels, and 
penalizing banks for imprudent and inefficient management. If they freely get 
access to the information relevant for assessing regulators’ activities, taxpayers 
could force the regulators to accomplish this responsibility. However, the 
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16  Kane (1995) warns us against carelessly assuming that regulators are fully 
trustworthy or automatically pursue the social role assigned to them. As he argues, 
“the faith-full agent presumption focused economists’ attention on evaluating 
pricing and regulatory structures rather than on analyzing the web of incentives 





çasymmetric information hinders taxpayers from precisely evaluating regulators’ 
behavior. It is difficult for taxpayers to determine whether the regulators 
ostensibly regulate in pursuit of objectives quite different from those assigned by 
taxpayers.
17 
     There are a few piece of evidence that the regulators were not effectively 
disciplined in Japan. For example, in 1954 the MOF introduced the capital 
adequacy regulation, which required banks to increase broadly defined capital to 
more than 10% of total deposits. However, the MOF allowed banks to have capital 
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17    At this point one must address Kane’s (1995: 441) suggestion that 
“manager-stockholder conflict poses a counterincentive to pressures for 
deposit-institution risk-taking.” That is, if managers dominate bank 
decision-making, the safety net would not necessarily motivate banks to expand 
risk-taking because these activities “exposes the manager’s human capital to 
career damage that is hard to diversify.” This argument is relevant here because 
conventional wisdom holds that Japanese corporations, including banks, are 
organized and monitored in ways that bear little resemblance to the commonly 
assumed shareholder-oriented agency model of corporate management (e.g., 
Prowse (1992:1122) and Milhaupt (1996)). In addition, the practice of long-term 
employment in Japan makes human capital more specific so that career damage 
becomes all the more serious an issue. Even if managers dominate 
decision-making, however, regulators can mitigate the threat greater bank risk 
poses to human resources for bank managers if they adopt a policy of forbearance 
towards those banks with which they colludes. To the extent this regulatory 
approach limits career damage, it also reduce the effectiveness of the 
counter-incentive mechanism identified by Kane (1995). More specifically, if 
bank managers can collude with regulators through amakudari to reduce the 
likelihood of a human capital crisis for managers, the practice of amakudari is 





çsubstantially lower than the required levels. Consequently, the bank on the 
average decreased capital/deposits ratio from 6% around 1970 to the level lower 
than 4% at the mid 1980s (Horiuchi (1999)).   
     The prevailing practice in the Japanese banking industry of accepting 
ex-senior officials from the regulatory authorities on to banks’ managerial boards 
may be a form of collusion in which banks provide regulators with job 
opportunities after retirement, and in turn, regulators indulge banks in expanding 
their business by increasing their leverage ratios. Since a higher leverage ratio 
implies a greater possibility of financial distress for the banks and larger transfers 
of risk from banks to the safety net, the collusion manifest in amakudari will 
ultimately undermine the viability of the safety net. Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001) 
empirically test this hypothesis based on data of more than 120 regional banks. 
Their result cannot refute the hypothesis. 
 
     T h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  disciplining the regulator: The principal-agent problem 
with regard to regulatory processes also indicates the danger of forbearance 
policies. The regulator responsible for disciplining banks for sound management 
will desire to conceal existence of distressed banks and to postpone definite 
disposition of virtually failed banks. This forbearance policy will induce those 
banks to undertake excessive risk-taking, and will increase the social costs of 
bailing out them to protect depositors and other investors. 
     National legislators could prevent collusion between regulators and banks 
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çfrom undermining the effectiveness of the safety net if they could either precisely 
monitor the regulator or introduce the system incentives compatible with the 
policy objectives assigned to the regulatory agency. In reality, however, neither 
legislators nor taxpayers have access to all of the relevant information about 
regulators and their behavior.
18  
     Thus, the Japanese people were not given incentives to monitor bank 
regulators until at least the beginning of the 1990s. And, although deposit 
insurance was introduced in 1971, it remained nominal until 1992. The MOF dealt 
with the management problems of individual banks by forcing relatively sound 
banks (in most cases, large city banks) to merge with those at the brink of 
bankruptcy. On the surface this policy did not create any obvious burden for 
taxpayers. In addition, the legal framework supporting deposit insurance did not 
include any explicit rules or procedures for injecting taxpayers’ money into the 
bail out scheme of unsound banks. The regulatory practice obscured the extent to 
which taxpayers were required to share the social costs of the safety net. Because 
they were unaware of the actual costs of poorly managed banks, Japanese 
taxpayers were largely not attentive towards monitoring bank regulators. 
     After  the  bursting of the ‘bubble’ at the beginning of the 1990s, the growing 
amount of non-performing loans in the banking sector and the clumsiness of the 
MOF in dealing with distressed banks revealed the demerits of the existing safety 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
18  Moreover, if those with access to relatively greater information are limited in 
number, they too can be seduced into the collusion relationship. In other words, 





çnet. As we have explained at the beginning of this paper, the weakness of the 
safety net forced the Japanese government to prepare public funds to deal with the 
bank crisis. These developments made the Japanese people recognize the 
importance of monitoring the regulators’ implementation of the safety net.   
 
 
2.4 Delayed disposition of NPLs 
     We  have  stressed  that  there  existed a vacuum in the governance of Japanese 
banks’ management in the sense that nobody was effectively motivated to monitor 
and discipline bank managers. It is easy for us to understand that a vacuum of 
governance tends to induce incumbent bank managers to take aggressive policy 
under the protective safety net. I think that the non-performing loan problem since 
the early 1990s was a consequence of the aggressive expansionism policy adopted 
by bank managers during the late 1980s. But the vacuum of governance was also 
responsible for the delayed process of disposing NPLs on the side of bank 
managers. 
     Bank managers have not strong incentives to assess dubious loans as 
non-performing and to quickly write them off partly because the loans may be 
recoverable when business picks up, and mostly because the quick write-off will 
decrease their capital bases revealing their mistakes in risk management. Of 
course, the wait and see policy regarding dubious loans is accompanied with risk, 







çthe debt less likely and because the collateral backing up the debt would loss their 
value. Thus, the wait and see policy would be too risky for banks’ shareholders 
and particularly for banks’ debt-holders. However, they are powerless to make 
bank managers hasten to dispose dubious loans due to the vacuum of 
governance.
19 
     The  regulators  neither  have  strong incentives to realize quick disposition of 
NPLs. The appearance of increasing amount of banks’ NPLs would be responsible 
not only for bank managers but also for the regulators to which a supervising role 
is delegated. The regulators would prefer the banks’ wait and see policy regarding 
NPLs to the quick disposition policy. The opaqueness of quality assessment of 
specific loans enhances these incentives to postpone disposing NPLs on the side 
of both bank managers and the regulators.
20   
 
2.5 Governance problem of cooperative financial institutions 
     In spite of heavy protection given by the MOF to cooperative financial 
institutions, the NPL problem has been more serious for those institutions than for 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççç ç
øĀççWith the NPL problem got worse, the bank managers had stronger incentives 
to delay in disposing NPLs. This was because decreases in current profits 
narrowed rooms for banks either to write off bad loans or to increase reserves for 
bad loans. Obviously bank managers had incentives to intentionally underrate the 
amount of NPLs in order to avoid booking negative profits.ç
20  The opaqueness of specific loans implies that the quick disposal of dubious 
loans might be destructive in the sense that banks are forced to sever a credit 
relationship with a promising but temporally distressed borrower firm. There may 





çother banks. The governance problem substantially accounts for the fragility of 
cooperative financial institutions. First of all, both shinkin banks and credit 
cooperatives are not incorporated and their management is rather loose. Because 
of their legal status, managers of those institutions are immune from direct 
disciplinary influence from the capital market. Part-timers occupy a majority of 
the board of directors in those institutions. As of March 1989, the ratios of 
part-timers in the total number of directors were 42.4% for shinkin banks and 
73.1% for credit cooperatives respectively. Quite often a small number of 
directors can monopolize the decision-making of the boards. Moreover, the 
supervision of credit cooperatives by the financial authority used to be ineffective 
because the government delegated supervisory activities to the local governments 
who did not have sufficient expertise to fulfill the delegated role.21  It is 
noteworthy that the cooperative financial institutions were allowed to extend their 
business territories under this weak governance structure in the late 1980s. 
 
 
3. A Vacuum of Governance and Market Responses 
     Could we derive any lessons from the complicated relation between the 
development of the NPL problem and responses of the capital market in Japan? In 
my view, at least until the summer of 1995, investors in the capital market 
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bank-firm credit relationships. 
21  The Japanese government decided to take back the role of supervising credit 





çbelieved in the government’s capability of implementing the traditional 
wide-scope safety net, the vulnerability of the banking sector did not provoke the 
capital market. Although investors had recognized deterioration of bank 
performance due to rapid increases in non-performing loans, they trusted that the 
traditional blanket guaranty would protect them from losses associated with bank 
failures in the end.
22  Thus, they did not think it necessary to differentiate good 
banks from bad ones. 
     However, as the non-performing loan problem dragged on in the banking 
sector, the traditional safety net apparently reached a dead end, incurring 
investor’s distrust of the government’s capability to bail out distressed banks. The 
Japanese major banks, which used to play an important role in the government’s 
traditional bailout, are now suffering from a huge amount of NPLs. Thus, the 
traditional bailout scheme is no longer functioning smoothly. Then, the market 
started disciplining bank management. 
     For  example,  the positive Japan  premium was not observed until the end of 
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monitoring of the financial institutions. 
22  Moody’s, a US rating company, started downgrading of some Japanese banks 
as early as June 1986 well before the ‘bubble’ burst. The total number of 
downgrades of Japanese banks by Moody’s from June 1986 to June 1998 was 73. 
Some of Japanese investors started to concern soundness of a few banks that were 
reported to be seriously damaged by increasing NPLs in the first half of the 1990s. 
The three long-term credit banks used to issue their bank debentures at precisely 
equal interest rates until the beginning of the 1990s. That is, the investors did not 
differentiate those banks in terms of their managerial soundness. However, the 





çSeptember 1995. The Japan premium at the end of September was only 1.042 
basis point (in terms of 3 month US dollar). However, the premium jumped to 
20.313 basis point at the beginning of October.
23  This abrupt jump was caused 
by the announcement on September 29 that the U.S. authority discovered Daiwa 
Bank's wrongdoing in New York. The MOF’s handling of the Daiwa case was 
rather awkward. This fact also contributed to the market turbulence. Associated 
with a number of bank failures in the summer of 1995, this scandal triggered 
skepticism in the financial markets of the government’s capability to stabilize the 
banking system by means of the traditional safety net as they used to do. The 
abrupt jump in the Japan premium reflected the wide spread skepticism among 
investors. 
    Once investors disbelieved the government capability of implementing the 
blanket guaranty, they were naturally motivated to severely monitor and discipline 
bank management. In short, the capital market started to fill the vacuum of 
governance in bank management. In order to ‘calm down’ the capital market, the 
government should have quickly strengthened monitoring and disciplining bank 
management. Unfortunately, the Japanese government did not recognize this 
çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççççççççççççççç çççççççççççççççççç
banks’ debentures.   
23  The Japan premium shows that Japanese banks pay a higher interest rate in 
the international inter-bank money markets. I t  r e f l e c t s  i n v e s t ors' evaluation of 
Japanese banks relative to their foreign rivals. The higher Japan premium suggests 
investors are more seriously concerned with capacity of Japanese banks to repay 
their debt. Thus, as well as banks’ share prices, the Japan premium is one of the 
most conspicuous signals through which the capital market disseminates its 





çdevelopment in the capital market and failed to introduce effective measures to 
force banks to quickly re-capitalize. 
     In the framework of banks’ management governance, the capital market is 
expected to prevent deterioration of banks’ management well before a bank crisis 
occurs. In reality, the disciplining mechanism of capital market started when most 
of banks were troubled with a large amount of non-performing loans. Thus, it is 
not strange at all that the capital market treated banks quite harshly. From the 
bank managers’ viewpoint, the capital market functioned rather destructively. 
Some people may criticize the capital market for its brutal way in which it deals 
w ith distressed banks. How ever, we sh ould note that the government has long 
neglected to fill the vacuum in the governance of bank management, and that the 
capital market started to fill the vacuum just at the worst timing. In order to avoid 
the destructive force of the capital market, the government should have committed 
itself to fill the vacuum in place of the capital market. 
     Any  policy  measures  to  cope  with the current bank crisis would fail without 
a positive response from the capital market. The government and the capital 
market are struggling with each other to fill the governance vacuum in the bank 
management. If the government wins, the market will be calmed down. However, 
if the government loses this struggle, the market will become cruel for the time 
being. This episode shows how the market could be an effective instrument not 
only for disciplining bank management, but also for disciplining the regulators in 
the financial system. Thus, we could use the capital market to mitigate the 
principal-agent problem with respect to the regulation only if we feed the relevant 







4. Concluding Remarks 
     This paper made an overview of the recent bank crisis in Japan from the 
management governance perspective. It would be an exaggeration to say that this 
perspective could account for all the aspects of Japan’s bank crisis. For example, 
the government’s mismanagement regarding the monetary policy that resulted in 
an excessive financial expansion in the late 1980s, and the long-lasting slow-down 
of industrial sectors since the early 1990s were responsible for the fragility of the 
banking sector. However, we should not neglect some issues related to the 
governance of bank management to understand the developments of the NPL 
problems. We stressed that there existed a vacuum in the Japanese bank 
managerial governance. Neither the capital market nor the government was unable 
to prevent the banks’ expansionist policy that caused a huge amount of NPLs, and 
to induce prompt reorganization of the banks’ management after their fragility 
was revealed. Thus, the most important lesson we learn from Japan’s experience is 
that the governance structure is quite important for constructing and maintaining a 
stable financial system.   
     To  construct  apparently  modern  and  sophisticated  financial  institutions  does 
not necessarily lead to attainment of financial stability. To extend the government 
capability of intervening into management of banks and financial institutions does 
not necessarily improve their management and contribute to stabilizing the 
financial system. The managers of banks and other financial institutions should be 





çbe motivated to do good jobs as an agent to monitor bank management. The recent 
bank crisis in Japan suggests that it is not so easy to build up such an incentive 
compatible system. 
     We have, however, an optimistic view that Japan is just in process of 
constructing a more stable financial system from the governance viewpoint. There 
are good grounds for this optimism. First, the Japanese capital market has been 
quickly developing its capacity of evaluating individual banks’ management. The 
recent resolution of mutual shareholding between banks and their client firms will 
enhance the capital market capability in this regard. The so-called pay-off policy 
that the government started at April 2002 will strengthen the capital market 
monitoring, because the policy implies a more limited scope of the financial 
safety net than the traditional one prevailing in Japan until the end of the 1990s. 
     Second,  the  government’s intervention into banks’ management is becoming 
more and more transparent after the adoption of the prompt corrective action rule 
in April 1998. According to this rule, the government must intervene to bank 
management following explicitly specified criteria based on banks’ capital 
adequacy ratios. Thus, this rule will help us to monitor the government 
administration regarding financial stability more precisely than before, and will 
contribute to prevention of the government’s notorious forbearance policy. In 
addition, the Financial Services Agency is reportedly endeavoring to construct a 
sort of arm’s length relationships with the banks it supervises. Both the 
transparent administration and the arm’s length relationships between the 
regulator and regulated banks will substantially mitigate the agency problem we 





ç     Finally, we hope that the Japanese financial system will be more widely 
exposed to full-scale competition in the near future. The ‘Big Bang’ financial 
reform has already made the Japanese financial system more competitive. Better 
or worse, the bank crisis since the early 1990s has been destroying the coalition of 
vested interest groups in the Japanese financial system that had resisted 
developments of full-scale competition in the financial system. The competition in 
the Japanese financial system will inevitably heighten, and it will exert 
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b)  Shinkin banks Credit cooperatives Total 
1990 0  0  0  0 
1991 1  0  0  1 
1992 0  1  0  1 
1993 0  1  1  2 
1994 1  0  4  5 
1995 1  0  5  6 
1996 2  3  3  8 
1997 5  0  7  12 
1998 3  1  31  35 
1999 5  6  15  26 
2000 1  5  27  33 
 2001  1  9  37  47 
Total 20  26  130  176 
Notes: (a) This table contains not only the cases of bank failures dealt with the 
government, but also those privately disposed. For example, in October 1994, 
Mitsubishi Bank rescued Nippon Trust Bank at the brink of bankruptcy on its own 
initiative. The government did not provide any financial support in this case. But 
this table contains it. (b) This column includes city banks, regional I and II banks, 
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